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A HUMANITARIAN EXCEPTION:  THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR U.S. 




The United Nations Charter provides that countries are prohibited 
from the use of force except when done in self-defense or when 
authorized by the United Nations Security Council.  Although the United 
States’ airstrikes against Syria in 2017 and 2018 did not fit into either 
of those two exceptions, the airstrikes were legal under international law 
due to an exception for humanitarian intervention.  The question of 
whether customary international law recognizes such an exception is far 
from settled.  Most scholars of international law believe that 
humanitarian intervention is not a part of customary international law, 
while a minority hold the opposite view.  This Article sides with the 
latter.  It argues that an exception for humanitarian intervention exists 
as part of customary international law because such interventions are a 
widespread practice among states and are accepted as law by a 
sufficient number of states.  Additionally, the adoption of such an 
exception would lead to a more just world because it would allow states 
to intervene to stop or mitigate humanitarian crises.  There are, 
naturally, risks associated with the adoption of a humanitarian 
exception, such as states abusing the exception to pursue less than 
altruistic goals.  That risk, however, can be mitigated by adherence to 
guidelines that humanitarian interventions would have to meet in order 
to be legal.  Applying the set of guidelines from the Responsibility to 
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The Syrian Civil War has claimed the lives of more than four 
hundred thousand people since it began in 2011.1  Many of those deaths 
were civilians killed during Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s 
campaign to regain control of the country.2  The U.S. responded by 
conducting airstrikes against the Syrian regime, once after a chemical 
weapons attack in 2017 that killed over eighty civilians and again after 
another chemical attack in 2018 that killed more than forty civilians.3   
This presents the question of whether the strikes were legal under 
international law.  The U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force but 
provides exceptions for when force is used in self-defense or when 
authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).  Even 
though the U.S. airstrikes did not fit into either of those exceptions, this 
 
 1. Global Conflict Tracker: Civil War in Syria, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., 
https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-syria (last updated Apr. 9, 
2021). 
 2. See The Editors of Encyclopaedia Brittanica, Syrian Civil War, BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Syrian-Civil-War/Civil-war (last visited Apr. 5, 2021). 
 3. Helene Cooper et al., U.S., Britain and France Strike Syria Over Suspected Chemical 
Weapons Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/world/middleeast/trump-strikes-syria-attack.html; 
Syria chemical ‘attack’: What we know, BBC (Apr. 26, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39500947. 
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Article argues the strikes were legal due to the customary international 
law exception to the U.N. Charter’s prohibition on the use of force—
humanitarian intervention. 
This Article will proceed by explaining the background of the 
Syrian Civil War and President Assad’s use of chemical weapons against 
civilians.  It will then discuss when the U.N. Charter allows for the use 
of force, and the current scholarship on whether an exception for 
humanitarian intervention exists as part of customary international law.   
Recognizing that most scholars do not think such an exception 
exists, this Article will show how the customary international law 
exception for humanitarian intervention has come into being.  In order 
for a practice to become a part of customary international law it must be 
(1) a widespread practice among states and (2) accepted as law by states.  
Humanitarian intervention meets both those criteria.  As to the first point, 
evidence of state practice exists in the Cold War era as illustrated by 
India’s intervention in East Pakistan, Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda, 
and Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia.4  The most important example 
of state practice emerged in the post-Cold War era when the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened to stop the 
humanitarian crisis in Kosovo.5  As to the second point, humanitarian 
intervention is sufficiently, though certainly not universally, accepted by 
states as law.  The United Kingdom (U.K.) and Belgium have viewed 
humanitarian intervention as legal since Kosovo.6  The United States’ 
position is less clear, though it is accepting of the legality of 
humanitarian intervention.  Furthermore, retroactive praise from states 
following humanitarian interventions is evidence of yet more states’ 
implicit support for the legality of humanitarian intervention. 
This Article will then provide a policy argument to lend support for 
the idea that humanitarian intervention should exist as part of customary 
international law.  Indeed, the benefits of the existence of such an 
exception outweigh its disadvantages and would result in a more just 
world.  Recognizing the existence of the exception would allow states to 
halt or mitigate humanitarian crises.  Although the possibility that states 
may abuse humanitarian interventions to achieve their strategic goals 
remains, these concerns can be lessened by the presence of guidelines 
that states would have to meet for their actions to be legal.  The final 
portion of the policy argument will examine how adherence to one set of 
guidelines set out in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), would allow for 
 
 4. See infra Section IV.B. 
 5. See infra Section IV.B. 
 6. See infra Section IV.C. 
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legal humanitarian interventions like the U.S. airstrikes against Syria but 
would not allow for actions like Russia’s annexation of Crimea. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR 
Demonstrations against President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in 
Syria began in March 2011 as part of a larger political upheaval 
sweeping the Middle East—the Arab Spring.7  What ensued was a multi-
faction civil war.8 
Since the beginning of the war, the Assad regime was accused of 
committing war crimes against Syrian civilians.9  On August 20, 2012, 
“President Obama threaten[ed] to act militarily if Syria cross[ed] a ‘red 
line’ and use[d] chemical weapons.”10  While initial reports of the Assad 
regime’s use of chemical weapons had surfaced earlier, the most serious 
incident involved a sarin gas attack in August 2013 “that killed more 
than 1,400 civilians in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta.”11  Appearing as 
though President Obama’s “red-line” had been breached, the U.S. did 
not engage in a military strike against the Assad regime.12  Instead, the 
Obama administration decided on a diplomatic solution in which Assad 
agreed to relinquish his chemical weapons stockpile under a United 
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR).13 
Bashar al-Assad, however, did not comply with the agreement.  On 
April 4, 2017, Assad again used chemical weapons against civilians in 
the northern Idlib province, which resulted in the deaths of eighty-eight 
people.14  Bashar al-Assad refused to accept responsibility for the attacks 
 
 7. Why has the Syrian war lasted 10 years?, BBC (Mar. 12, 2021), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229; Mona Yacoubian, Syria Timeline: 
Since the Uprising Against Assad, U.S. INST. PEACE (Jan. 1, 2021), 
https://www.usip.org/syria-timeline-uprising-against-assad. 
 8. See Alicia Sanders-Zakre, What You Need to Know About Chemical Weapons Use in 
Syria, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2018-09-23/what-you-
need-know-about-chemical-weapons-use-syria (last updated Mar. 14, 2019). 
 9. Ved P. Nanda, The Future Under International Law of the Responsibility to Protect 
After Libya and Syria, 21 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 1, 14-20 (2013). 
 10. Haley Bissegger, Timeline: How President Obama handled Syria, HILL (Sept. 15, 
2013, 10:00 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/international/322283-timeline-of-how-president-
obama-handled-syria-. 
 11. Sanders-Zakre, supra note 8. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See id. 
 14. Julia Masterson, Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2020, ARMS 
CONTROL ASS’N, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-
Weapons-Activity (last updated May 2020); Chain of events after suspected Syria chemical 
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and disputed them as a “fabrication.”15  Similarly, Russia stated that the 
Syrian Air Force had struck a terrorist weapons depot that housed the 
chemical munitions, which in turn released them.16  Those assertions, 
however, were not credible.  In October 2017, a joint investigative 
mechanism between the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW) and the United Nations found the Assad regime 
guilty of conducting the April 4 attack.17  The OPCW is the international 
body designated to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention, an 
agreement to which the United States, Russia, and Syria are parties.18  In 
response to the attack on April 4, President Trump ordered a strike on 
the Shayrat airbase, which was believed to be the launch site of the 
chemical weapons attack.19 
Approximately a year later, Assad again used chemical weapons 
against civilians, this time near Damascus, which killed forty-two 
people.20  On April 14, 2018 the U.S., as well as France and the United 
Kingdom, launched an attack against the Assad regime’s chemical 
weapons infrastructure.21  The strike hit a “scientific research center in 
Damascus, [a] chemical weapons storage facility, located west of Homs, 
[a]nd a chemical weapons equipment storage facility and command post 
near Homs.”22 
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM 
The discussion above raises the question of whether the Trump 
administration’s military strikes against the Syrian regime violate 
international law. 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the “threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state[.]”23  
 
 15. Syria chemical ‘attack’, supra note 3. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Masterson, supra note 14. 
 18. Chemical Weapons Convention Signatories and States-Parties, ARMS CONTROL 
ASS’N, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcsig (last updated June 2018). 
 19. Timeline: US intervention in Syria’s war since 2011, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 7, 2019), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/timeline-intervention-syria-war-2011-
191007190255685.html. 
 20. Ben Hubbard, Dozens Suffocate in Syria as Government Is Accused of Chemical 
Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/08/world/middleeast/syria-chemical-attack-ghouta.html. 
 21. Timeline: US intervention in Syria’s war since 2011, supra note 19. 
 22. James Griffiths & Laura Smith-Spark, What we know about the Syria strikes, CNN 
(Apr. 14, 2018, 4:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/14/middleeast/syria-strikes-what-
we-know-intl/index.html. 
 23. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
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This prohibition is accepted as jus cogens,24 which means that the 
concept is so fundamental to the inter-relationship of states that a state 
cannot deviate from it.25  There are, however, two U.N. Charter based 
exceptions from the general prohibition.  First, pursuant to Chapter VII, 
a state may use force if the United Nations Security Council provides 
authorization.26  Second, pursuant to Article 51 a state, or collection of 
states, may use force in self-defense in response to an armed attack.27 
There is, nevertheless, the possibility that humanitarian 
intervention could still comply with international law if such an 
exception could be deemed to be customary international law.  A 
practice becomes a part of customary international law when two 
elements are met; there must be (1) a general practice among states and 
(2) a belief among states that such practice is legally authorized, also 
known as opinio juris.28  Regarding the first element, the practice must 
be sufficiently widespread as well as consistent.29  Regarding the second 
element, the practice must be undertaken “with a sense of legal right or 
obligation.”30 
The majority view among international law scholars is that 
humanitarian intervention is not a part of customary international law.31  
This camp of scholars argues that there can be no humanitarian 
intervention exception to the United Nations Charter’s prohibition on the 
use of force because the requisite elements needed to establish a practice 
as part of customary international law are simply not met.32  One scholar, 
Derek Jinks, encapsulates the majority’s position on the issue of state 
practice.  He refuses to accept that there is an exception for humanitarian 
intervention because “state practice regarding the legality of 
humanitarian intervention at present is neither sufficiently extensive nor 
sufficiently uniform to support the conclusion that the [United Nations] 
Charter permits it.”33  Other scholars, such as Dapo Akande, argue that 
 
 24. Daniela Abratt, U.S. Intervention in Syria: A Legal Responsibility to Protect?, 95 
DENV. L. REV. 21, 36 (2017); Dapo Akande, The Legality of Military Action in Syria: 
Humanitarian Intervention and Responsibility to Protect, BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L. (Aug. 28, 
2013), https://www.ejiltalk.org/humanitarian-intervention-responsibility-to-protect-and-the-
legality-of-military-action-in-syria/. 
 25. SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 106 (3d ed. 2018). 
 26. See U.N. Charter art. 42. 
 27. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 28. MURPHY, supra note 25, at 102, 104. 
 29. Id. at 102. 
 30. Id. at 104. 
 31. Richard B. Bilder, Kosovo and the “New Interventionism” Promise or Peril?, 9 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 153, 161 (1999). 
 32. See id. at 161. 
 33. Goodman, What Do Top Legal Experts Say About the Syria Strikes?, JUST SECURITY 
(Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/39712/top-legal-experts-syria-strikes/. 
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“there is little opinio juris on which a doctrine of customary international 
law might be based.”34  Indeed, scholars point to the fact that the only 
member of the United Nations Security Council, and major nation in 
general, to explicitly support the idea of a humanitarian intervention 
exception under customary international law is the United Kingdom.35 
Opponents of the humanitarian intervention exception also argue 
against accepting the legality of such a practice on policy grounds.  The 
main thrust of this argument is based on the idea that powerful states 
could abuse humanitarian intervention to pursue less than altruistic 
goals, which would in turn create a more chaotic and less just world.36  
The most heinous example of this occurred in 1939, when Nazi Germany 
annexed the Sudetenland in order to protect ethnic Germans living there 
and then subsequently invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia.37  Scholars in 
this camp also raise the question of what is truly just and moral.38  During 
the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, for example, President Clinton 
was assured that the United States and its allies had “done the right 
thing” by stopping Slobodan Milosevic from completing his objective of 
ethnically cleansing Kosovo.39  While that view was certainly shared by 
many around the world, there was also another view of NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo.  Richard Bilder expressed this view in an 
interesting analogy to antiquity: 
From [nonwestern governments’] standpoint, the relevant analogy 
was not the United States and NATO cavalry bravely riding to the 
rescue of about to be butchered, helpless, decent settlers, but of an 
arrogant and bullying Imperial Rome, with its docile and subservient 
“allies” in tow, launching a brutal punitive expedition against a small 
and weak nation that had the temerity to try to preserve its 
sovereignty and defy Rome’s ultimatums and hegemony—in the 
process devastating its territory, killing and humiliating its people, 
and seeking to capture and bring its leaders in chains to Rome—read, 
the Hague—as a lesson to others.40 
Perhaps the analogy indulges in some hyperbole, but it does present a 
relevant concern that many states around the world have about 
humanitarian intervention.  When does a situation rise to the requisite 
 
 34. Akande, supra note 24. 
 35. See, e.g., id. 
 36. Bilder, supra note 31, at 160-61. 
 37. Id.; see generally History.com Editors, Nazis take Czechoslovakia , HISTORY, 
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/nazis-take-czechoslovakia (last updated July 28, 
2019). 
 38. See Bilder, supra note 31, at 160. 
 39. Id. at 153. 
 40. Id. at 154. 
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level of moral necessity to warrant a humanitarian intervention by 
foreign powers?  To what extent will those powers use such interventions 
to pursue their own, non-humanitarian, policy goals? 
On the other hand, a minority of scholars view humanitarian 
intervention as a part of customary international law.  One of those 
scholars, Sir Daniel Bethlehem, argued that humanitarian intervention 
has become an exception under customary international law because of 
the confluence of several “threads” that although “fragile” and not 
compelling in isolation, become “robust and compelling” when woven 
together.41  The eight threads that constitute Sir Bethlehem’s strand are: 
(1) the United Nations objective as stated in its preamble to “reaffirm 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person”; (2) the “last resort right of States to act in situations of distress 
. . . and circumstances of necessity,” as recognized by international law; 
(3) the international legal concept that egregious and illegal acts by states 
cannot go unaddressed; (4) examples of states engaging in humanitarian 
intervention, such as Vietnam invading Cambodia; (5) the 1991 no-fly 
zone over Iraq; (6) NATO’s 1999 Kosovo intervention; (7) 
Responsibility to Protect (which will be explained later in the Article); 
and (8) developments in international criminal law.42 
Along a similar vein, some scholars in this camp, such as Milena 
Sterio, have argued that the rapid acceptance and states’ willingness to 
engage in humanitarian interventions constitutes what they term “a 
Grotian moment.”43  The term is named after the Dutch Scholar Hugo 
Grotius, who is often credited with creating modern international law.44  
A Grotian moment means a transformative development in which new 
rules and doctrines of customary international law emerge with unusual 
rapidity and acceptance.45  As the argument goes, NATO intervention in 
Kosovo was a watershed moment.46  Although the bombing campaign 
aimed at preventing Yugoslav forces from perpetrating a humanitarian 
crisis in Kosovo did not have authorization from the United Nations 
Security Council, “the global consensus on [the] intervention was that it 
was ‘unlawful but legitimate.’ ” 47  This in turn sparked the creation of 
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, which attempted to refashion the 
 
 41. Daniel Bethlehem, Stepping Back a Moment – The Legal Basis in Favour of a 
Principle of Humanitarian Intervention, BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L. (Sept. 12, 2013). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See generally Milena Sterio, Humanitarian Intervention Post-Syria: A Grotian 
Moment?, 20 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 343 (2014). 
 44. Id. at 344. 
 45. Id. at 344-45. 
 46. Id. at 347. 
 47. Id. 
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way states in the international system viewed their sovereignty and also 
authorized humanitarian interventions in limited circumstances.48  Other 
scholars, like Harold Koh, follow a similar line of reasoning.49  He 
argues that Kosovo was a watershed moment for the development of 
humanitarian intervention in customary international law, and that the 
Responsibility to Protect shifted the view of humanitarian intervention 
from states’ right to intervene, to a “collective notion that the 
international community has a duty or ‘responsibility to protect’ a 
nation’s citizens when the national government has undeniably forfeited 
that responsibility.”50 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Authorization by the United Nations Security Council and Self-
Defense 
The Trump administration’s humanitarian interventions in 2017 
and 2018 would be illegal under the U.N. Charter. 
First, the United States did not receive UNSC authorization to use 
military force against Syria.51  This was not for a lack of trying.52  Russia 
and China have partnered in vetoing various Security Council 
Resolutions authorizing the use of force against Syria for its use of 
chemical weapons against civilians.53  For example, the veto of Security 
Council Draft Resolution (S/2017/172) on February 28, 2017, marked 
the seventh time that Russia had vetoed an attempt at Security Council 
authorization and the sixth time China had done so.54 
Second, the United States did not act in self-defense.  Syria’s use of 
chemical weapons was part of an intrastate conflict affecting Syrian 
civilians and was not a direct attack on the U.S. or its allies.55  Although 
during an interview with CNN, President Obama implied that the U.S. 
would be acting in self-defense since core U.S. interests were implicated 
 
 48. Id. at 347; see generally INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001) [hereinafter R2P]. 
 49. Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part II: 
International Law and the Way Forward), JUST SECURITY (Oct. 2, 2013), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/1506/koh-syria-part2/. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Michael Schmitt & Chris Ford, The Use of Force in Response to Syrian Chemical 
Attacks: Emergence of a New Norm?, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 8, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/39805/force-response-syrian-chemical-attacks-emergence-
norm/. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.; Akande, supra note 24. 
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by the chemical weapons attack, such a connection is tenuous at best.56  
While it is true that the U.S. seeks to stop the proliferation of chemical 
weapons and to protect its allies near Syria, there remains no serious 
threat or actual use of chemical weapons against the U.S. or its allies in 
the region such as Turkey and Israel.57 
B. Customary International Law: State Practice 
In order to be legal, U.S. military action against the Assad regime 
must fit into a customary international law exception to the prohibition 
on the use of force.  Customary international law provides such an 
exception for humanitarian intervention outside the framework of the 
U.N. Charter.  The first step in establishing that such humanitarian 
intervention is part of customary international law is showing that such 
action is a general practice among states.58  This is arguably the case with 
respect to humanitarian intervention. 
There are three clear examples of states engaging in humanitarian 
interventions in the Cold War era.  First, India’s intervention into East 
Pakistan, now known as Bangladesh, in order to stop the genocide 
against the largely Hindu Bengali minority.59  The Indian government 
justified its military action, in part, by presenting Pakistan’s military 
oligarchy as analogous to Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich.60  It additionally 
circulated a then secret, though now public, report among Indian 
leadership describing the purpose of the intervention as saving the 
population of East Pakistan from a genocide directed by the Pakistani 
government.61  Second, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in response to 
the genocide perpetrated by the communist Khmer Rouge regime.62  Pol 
Pot, Cambodia’s Marxist leader, killed approximately two million of his 
own people and was only stopped in 1979 when Vietnam invaded and 
 
 56. See Alan Silverleib, Exclusive: Obama tells CNN key decisions nearing on Syria, 
Egypt, CNN (Aug. 23, 2013, 3:01 PM), https://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/23/politics/obama-
cnn-new-day-interview. 
 57. See Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Opinion, On Syria, a U.N. Vote Isn’t 
Optional, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/opinion/on-
syria-a-un-vote-isnt-optional.html?hp. 
 58. MURPHY, supra note 25, at 102. 
 59. Gary J. Bass, The Indian Way of Humanitarian Intervention, 40 YALE J.  INT’L L. 
227, 253-55 (2015). 
 60. Id. at 253. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Abratt, supra note 24, at 47. 
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deposed him.63  Third, Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda and the overthrow 
of Idi Amin’s regime on humanitarian grounds.64 
NATO’s air campaign over Kosovo provides an example of states 
engaging in humanitarian intervention during the post-Cold War era.65  
On March 24, 1999, nineteen NATO members began Operation Allied 
Force to prevent the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s (hereafter 
“Serbia”) ethnic cleansing of Albanians living in Kosovo.66  The 
bombing campaign focused on Slobodan Milosevic’s regime and its 
capacity to carry out its ethnic cleansing objective in Kosovo.67  By early 
June 1999, Serbia had capitulated and agreed to a phased withdrawal 
from Kosovo.68 
One may counter by arguing that state practice has not been 
established because evidence of states engaging in humanitarian 
intervention outside the U.N. framework is not sufficiently widespread 
or consistent.  Many scholars of international law—such as Oscar 
Schachter,69 Dapo Akande,70 and Derek Jinks71—have made such a 
claim.  While superficially plausible, this contention is unpersuasive 
because opportunities to engage in humanitarian intervention outside the 
U.N. framework are infrequent.72  In order for there to be an opportunity 
for a state to engage in humanitarian intervention there needs to be (1) a 
state perpetrating a humanitarian crisis and (2) a permanent member of 
the UNSC willing to use its veto to prevent authorization of the use of 
force against that state.  Libya is one example, among many, where a 
humanitarian intervention outside the U.N. framework could have 
occurred but did not due to Libya’s lack of backing by a permanent 
member of the UNSC.73 
 
 63. Id.; Khmer Rouge: Cambodia’s years of brutality, BBC (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-10684399. 
 64. See Farooq Hassan, Realpolitik in International Law: After Tanzanian-Ugandan 
Conflict “Humanitarian Intervention” Reexamined, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 859, 865 
(1981). 
 65. Koh, supra note 49. 
 66. Schmitt & Ford, supra note 51; BENJAMIN S. LAMBETH, NATO’S AIR WAR FOR 
KOSOVO: A STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT v, xvii (2001). 
 67. Bilder, supra note 31, at 153.   
 68. Note on NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1130, 1132 (Lori Damrosch & Sean Murphy eds., 7th ed. 2019). 
 69. Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1129, 1129-30 (Lori Damrosch & Sean Murphy eds., 7th ed. 
2019). 
 70. See Akande, supra note 24. 
 71. See Goodman, supra note 33. 
 72. See Jayshee Bajoria & Robert McMahon, The Dilemma of Humanitarian 
Intervention, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/dilemma-
humanitarian-intervention (last updated June 12, 2013, 8:00 AM). 
 73. See Abratt, supra note 24, at 48-49, 54. 
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C. Customary International Law: Opinio Juris 
The second element necessary to establish a practice as part of 
customary international law is opinio juris, or that states accept the 
practice as law.74  While there is certainly no global consensus on the 
legality of humanitarian intervention,75 a significant number of states, 
including three permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council, view such action as legal. 
The U.K.’s public position on humanitarian intervention is the 
clearest example of the legality of such a practice.  Despite lacking 
UNSC authorization for NATO’s operation in Kosovo, the U.K.’s 
Secretary of State for Defense, George Robertson, stated, “[w]e are in 
no doubt that NATO is acting within international law and our legal 
justification rests upon the accepted principle that force may be used in 
extreme circumstances to avert a human catastrophe.”76  In 2017, the 
U.K.’s Attorney General, Jeremy Wright, reiterated his country’s 
position that humanitarian intervention, in exceptional circumstances, 
exists as a customary law exception to the U.N.’s prohibition on the use 
of force.77 
Belgium has also explicitly supported the idea that humanitarian 
intervention serves as an exception to the U.N.’s prohibition on the use 
of force.  During its oral defense before the International Court of Justice 
on the Legality of Use of Force against Yugoslavia, Belgium presented 
the argument that NATO’s actions were justified by past precedent of 
states acting on the grounds of humanitarian necessity without UNSC 
authorization.78 
Furthermore, other NATO members’ participation in the bombing 
of Serbia provides tacit support for the humanitarian intervention 
exception under customary international law.  As the U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor during the 
Kosovo campaign noted in hindsight, all the members of NATO that 
participated in bombing Serbia accepted the legality of humanitarian 
intervention without UNSC approval.79  Certainly, no NATO member 
thought its actions against Serbia were illegal.   
 
 74. MURPHY, supra note 25, at 104. 
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Along a similar vein, the U.S. accepts the legality of humanitarian 
intervention because it (1) never perceives itself as violating 
international law and (2) has stated that it would conduct humanitarian 
interventions outside the U.N. Charter framework.80  If a country always 
views its international actions as legal, states that it will operate in a 
certain fashion, and does so, then it follows that the country supports the 
legality of such operations.  Kosovo represents the genesis of the United 
States’ position on the matter.  Although the U.S. never presented a 
formal legal opinion for Operational Allied Force,81 it both participated 
in a humanitarian intervention and presented a humanitarian 
justification, among others, for the operation.82 
The U.S. position on the legality of humanitarian intervention was 
crystallized during the Obama administration.  Its 2010 National 
Security Strategy states that the U.S. and “all member states of the U.N.” 
have recognized the responsibility to prevent humanitarian crises resides 
in sovereign states but passes to the international community when those 
states fail to prevent such crises or perpetrate them.83  This concept is 
called the Responsibility to Protect and is the name of a 2001 report by 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS).84  At a speech in Stockholm later in his first term, President 
Obama made the argument that the United States would be increasingly 
confronted with humanitarian crises in the future and would be 
compelled to act to uphold international norms despite not acting in self-
defense or lacking UNSC authorization.85  Shortly thereafter, President 
Obama addressed the U.N. General Assembly and said, “sovereignty 
cannot be a shield for tyrants” to commit human rights violations or for 
the international community to do nothing in response.86 
The Trump administration has continued the view of humanitarian 
intervention as legal.  The clearest expression of this view can be seen 
in former U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley’s statement at the UNSC, when 
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at 24. 
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 84. Nanda, supra note 9, at 5-6. 
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she warned that the U.S. would act without UNSC authorization to 
prevent humanitarian crises.87  On April 5, 2017, the U.K., France and 
the U.S. brought forward a UNSC resolution to both condemn and 
investigate a chemical weapons attack the Syrian government had 
perpetrated a day earlier.88  Yet, Russia protected Syria by vetoing the 
resolution.89  In response, Ambassador Haley stated, “[w]hen the United 
Nations consistently fails in its duty to act collectively, there are times 
in the life of states that we are compelled to take our own action.”90  On 
April 7, the U.S. conducted a missile strike against a Syrian regime air 
base.91 
There is, however, a significant amount of opposition to the concept 
of humanitarian intervention.  Russia has been a vocal opponent of 
humanitarian intervention when such opposition does not conflict with, 
but rather complements, its foreign policy objectives.92  For example, 
after NATO began Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Russia introduced 
a Security Council Resolution to condemn NATO’s campaign as a 
“flagrant violation” of the U.N. Charter.93  Vladimir Putin has felt so 
strongly about the illegality of humanitarian intervention taken outside 
the U.N. Charter that he wrote an opinion editorial in the New York Times 
in which he attempted to persuade the American public against military 
action in Syria during the Obama Administration.94  He argued that 
attacking the Assad regime (or humanitarian intervention in general) 
would risk destroying the idea underpinning “the stability of 
international relations”—the United Nation’s prohibition on the use of 
force absent Security Council authorization—and might even risk the 
United Nations suffering the “fate of the League of Nations.”95  
Ironically, Russia would engage in its own humanitarian intervention 
less than a year later in Crimea.96 
Like Russia, China views humanitarian intervention as illegal.  In 
2018, China condemned the United States’ airstrike against the Syrian 
 
 87. See Abratt, supra note 24, at 24. 
 88. Id. at 23-24. 
 89. See id. at 24. 
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regime as violating international law.97  In addition, a group of 130 
states, including China, issued the 2000 Declaration of the South 
Summit, which rejected the concept of humanitarian intervention 
because it has “no legal basis in the United Nations Charter.”98 
The concept of R2P suggests that the international community is 
reluctant to codify humanitarian intervention outside the confines of the 
U.N. Charter.  Both R2P’s original report and its final adoption in the 
2005 World Summit Outcome stress the need to address humanitarian 
crises through the UNSC.99  Although both versions conceive of the 
possibility of a state acting without UNSC authorization, such as through 
a General Assembly “Uniting for Peace” resolution,100 this non-UNSC 
authorization mechanism would still require a state to act through an 
organ of the U.N. and within its Charter. 
An important distinction, however, does exist between R2P and the 
World Summit Outcome.  R2P does not completely adhere to the belief 
that humanitarian interventions must occur within the confines of the 
U.N. Charter.  The ICISS envisioned that regional or sub-regional 
organizations could conduct humanitarian interventions within their 
boundaries when the UNSC rejects a proposal for legitimate 
humanitarian intervention.101  Such an action would directly contravene 
Article 53(1) of the U.N. Charter, which states that “no enforcement 
action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional 
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council . . . .”102  This 
suggests that some members of the international community do believe 
in the legality of humanitarian intervention.  Canada, for example, can 
be counted among those members since it created ICISS for the express 
purpose of addressing the tension between humanitarian intervention 
and state sovereignty.103  Another example of ICISS’ willingness to 
circumvent UNSC authorization of humanitarian interventions is evident 
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in the organization’s concern about the improper use of UNSC 
permanent member veto power.104 
Despite these counterarguments, states’ retroactive praise for 
humanitarian intervention points to the conclusion that states do 
generally accept the practice as legal.  For example, Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Spain, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and 
Turkey all expressed support for President Trump’s 2017 missile strike 
against a Syrian airbase in response to the Assad regime’s use of 
chemical weapons against civilians.105  Additionally, more nations 
supported than opposed or condemned the April 2018 airstrikes against 
Syria’s chemical weapons infrastructure.106  Thirty-nine countries 
expressed their support for the strikes, including all twenty-nine 
members of NATO,107 while seventeen countries condemned the 
strike.108  It would appear that the legality of humanitarian intervention, 
albeit in highly limited circumstances, has become a popular view 
among states. 
Furthermore, France’s participation in the April 2018 airstrikes 
against Syria provides additional evidence that it accepts the legality of 
humanitarian intervention.  After it had conducted the strikes, France 
justified its actions by alluding to their legality.109  At an emergency 
session of the United Nations Security Council the French ambassador 
stated: 
[o]ur action is in full conformity with the objectives and values 
enshrined in the United Nations Charter, from its very first lines.  Our 
organisation aims to ‘establish conditions under which justice and 
respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of 
international law can be maintained.’110 
Taken with its participation in Operation Allied Force in 1999, 
France’s participation in the April 2018 strike and subsequent 
justification suggest that the French government accepts the legality of 
humanitarian intervention.  This would mean that a majority of the 
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permanent members on the United Nations Security Council support the 
legality of humanitarian intervention. 
Russia’s failed attempts to condemn humanitarian interventions at 
the United Nations Security Council lends additional support to the idea 
that states do accept the legality of humanitarian intervention outside the 
U.N. Charter.  After the April 2018 air strikes against the Syrian regime, 
Russia introduced, but failed to pass, a United Nations Security Council 
Resolution condemning aggression against Syria perpetrated by the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and France.111  Eight countries voted 
against Russia’s proposed resolution—the U.S., the U.K., France, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Kuwait, Poland, and Ivory Coast—and four 
abstained, while only two countries voted with Russia—Bolivia and 
China.112  Russia also attempted to condemn NATO’s bombing 
campaign against Serbia as illegal, but failed because twelve members 
of the United Nations Security Council disagreed with Russia’s 
characterization of the operation.113  Indeed, Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, 
Canada, France, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Slovenia, 
the U.K., and the U.S. voted against Russia’s proposed resolution.114 
V. POLICY ARGUMENT 
The legal argument for the existence of a humanitarian intervention 
exception under customary international law is, admittedly, a close call.  
Therefore, it is necessary to assess whether accepting the humanitarian 
intervention exception or not would yield the best outcome.  Upon 
completing such an analysis, it is clear that customary international law 
should be interpreted to allow humanitarian interventions because its 
benefits outweigh its disadvantages and would result in a more just 
world.  Furthermore, states’ abuse of humanitarian intervention—the 
main policy argument against accepting humanitarian intervention as a 
customary law exception—can be mitigated by adherence to rules about 
such interventions.  An analysis of R2P’s rules for engaging in 
humanitarian intervention shows that legitimate actions, such as the U.S. 
airstrikes against Syria, would be allowed while illegitimate actions, 
such as Russia’s annexation of Crimea, would not. 
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A. The Advantage of the Humanitarian Intervention Exception 
The main advantage of recognizing a humanitarian intervention 
exception is the ability to stop humanitarian crises that would have 
continued were it not for such an intervention.  It is certainly morally 
just for a group of states to stop such crises.  In 1999, should NATO have 
left Albanian Kosovars to the ethnic cleansing, rapes, and massacres 
perpetrated by Slobodan Milosevic’s forces?115  The answer is no.  States 
should not be forced to stand aside and watch preventable mass human 
suffering, or to allow “the horror to unfold,” as former U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan phrased it.116  If a humanitarian intervention 
exception exists, there is at least the possibility that such horrors could 
be stopped or mitigated. 
B. Mitigating the Disadvantages of Humanitarian Intervention 
Exception 
The main disadvantage to accepting the humanitarian intervention 
exception is that states might abuse such interventions to achieve their 
own strategic objectives.  While certainly legitimate, this concern can be 
minimized with an accompanying set of guidelines accepted as part of 
the customary law exception.  The ICISS was aware of the potential for 
abuse when it wrote R2P and included six factors that an intervention 
would have to meet in order to be legal.117  They are: (1) right authority; 
(2) just cause; (3) right intention; (4) last resort; (5) proportional means; 
and (6) reasonable prospects.118 
In terms of right authority, the ICISS stipulated that UNSC 
authorization should be sought before launching any sort of 
humanitarian intervention.119  As R2P states, “[t]here is no better or more 
appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to authorize 
military intervention for human protection purposes.”120  If the UNSC 
refused to authorize the military action for whatever reason, then the 
matter could be taken to the floor of the UN General Assembly for a non-
binding “Uniting for Peace” procedure, or action could be taken by a 
regional organization.121 
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Just cause, the second factor, means that there must be serious and 
irreparable harm occurring to human beings or imminently likely to 
occur.122  The ICISS laid out two broad situations that, in its opinion, 
would justify the use of force.  The first is the “large scale loss of life, 
actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product 
either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a 
failed state situation.”123  The second is large-scale “ethnic cleansing.”124  
Interestingly, the ICISS explicitly stated that it would not quantify “large 
scale.”125 
The third factor is the right intention of military intervention.  While 
R2P recognizes that a military intervention may have multiple 
purposes,126 it is taken with the right intention when its primary purpose 
is to stop or mitigate human suffering.127 
Fourth, the humanitarian intervention must be taken as a last resort, 
meaning that it can only be justified if every non-military option to 
resolve the situation has been explored.128  “This does not necessarily 
mean that every such option must literally have been tried and failed.”129  
R2P recognizes that this is simply not realistic due to time constraints.130  
Yet, there must be “reasonable grounds” for the conclusion that a given 
option would not work, based on all the circumstances of the situation.131 
The fifth factor concerns proportional means to the ascertained 
threat.  According to R2P, a military intervention uses proportional 
means when the “scale, duration and intensity” of the intervention is the 
“minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in 
question.”132 
Finally, the military intervention must have a reasonable prospect 
of successfully “halting or averting the atrocities . . . that triggered the 
intervention in the first place.”133  The ICISS seemed to be most 
concerned about the possibility of a military intervention making a 
situation worse, even if it was taken for a humanitarian purpose.134 
 
 122. Id. at para. 4.18. 
 123. Id. at para. 4.19. 
 124. Id. 
 125. R2P, supra note 48, at para. 4.21. 
 126. See id. at para. 4.35. 
 127. See id. at para. 4.33. 
 128. Id. at XII. 
 129. Id. at para. 4.37. 
 130. Id. 
 131. R2P, supra note 48, at para. 4.37. 
 132. Id. at para. 4.39. 
 133. Id. at para. 4.41. 
 134. Id. 
 
830 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:61 
The following two sections will apply R2P’s factors to two 
situations—the United States’ airstrikes against Syria and Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea—and will illustrate how rules for engaging in 
humanitarian intervention would allow for legitimate humanitarian 
interventions and would recognize the illegality of illegitimate 
humanitarian interventions. 
1. U.S. Airstrikes in Syria 
U.S. airstrikes against the Syrian regime comply with R2P’s factors 
for humanitarian intervention. 
First, the administration’s airstrikes against the Assad regime in 
Syria were taken with the right authority due to Russia’s improper use 
of its Security Council veto.  The ICISS considered the Security Council 
veto, which each permanent member of the UNSC wields, as the 
principal obstacle to stopping humanitarian crises and lamented the 
unconscionable fact that “one veto can override the rest of humanity on 
matters of grave humanitarian concern.”135  To address this issue the 
ICISS supported prohibiting permanent members of the UNSC from 
using their veto power in situations where their “vital national interests” 
were not involved.136  Russia has violated that prohibition.  In August of 
2013, the UNSC failed to reach an agreement on a U.K. proposed 
resolution that would have authorized the use of military force against 
the Syrian regime.137  More recently, in April of 2018, Russia used its 
veto power to defeat an American UNSC resolution to investigate 
chemical weapons attacks in Syria.138 
Russia will certainly claim that its intervention in Syria and support 
of Bashar al-Assad are vital to its national interests.  Indeed, Russia 
views its actions in Syria as a conduit to be seen as a global power and 
to counter the spread of Islamic extremism by maintaining stability in 
the Middle East.139  The problem with the former assertion is that it is 
amorphous; there is no limit to when and where this justification could 
be used.  The latter, while superficially plausible, fails for two reasons.  
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The first reason is that humanitarian intervention would not stop Russia 
from achieving its objective: Bashar al-Assad would likely remain in 
power, and stability in the region would be maintained.  Following the 
Security Council backed deposal of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in 
2011,140 Russia most likely feared that approval of a military 
intervention would mean the destruction of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.  
Yet, Syria’s situation differed from that in Libya for one important 
reason—international support of the targeted leader.  Whereas Gaddafi 
could not depend on the support of any major nation,141 Assad could 
count on Iran’s support and its various Shia militias and Russia.142  Those 
countries’ commitment to the survival of the Assad regime would be a 
critical factor in American policymakers’ decision-making regarding 
whether to depose Assad and would, most likely, serve as a deterrent 
against intervention.143  As one commentator put it, Iran and Russia’s 
backing of the Syrian regime “effectively put an end to any realistic 
expectation of forced regime change in Syria in the foreseeable 
future.”144  Second, Russia has a serious problem with domestic Islamic 
extremism, as evidenced by the several terrorist attacks made in Russian 
cities and the ongoing jihadist insurgency in the Caucasus mountains.145  
Yet, the prevalence of Islamic extremist groups in Syria could actually 
be helping the situation in Russia.146  Having found more fertile ground 
for jihad, many extremists have fled to Syria, which has in turn reduced 
the amount of violence in the Caucasus.147 
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Second, President Trump’s air strikes against Syrian government 
targets fit the just cause requirement because they were taken in response 
to chemical attacks that caused large scale loss of life to civilians.148  
Between the 2017 and 2018 attacks, President Bashar al-Assad killed 
more than 120 of his own citizens.149 
Third, the strikes were taken with the right intention because their 
primary purpose was to “halt or avert human suffering.”150  After Syria’s 
2017 chemical weapons attack, President Trump described the attack as 
“a disgrace to humanity” and continued by stating that “[t]hese heinous 
actions by the Assad regime cannot be tolerated.  The United States 
stands with our allies across the globe to condemn this horrific attack 
. . . .”151  After the 2018 chemical attack and the United States’ 
subsequent air strikes, President Trump rhetorically asked why Iran and 
Russia would want to ally themselves to Syria, a nation associated with 
the “mass murder of innocent men, women and children?”152  Of course, 
actions taken in the international arena almost always have multiple 
purposes.  Yet, all R2P requires is that halting or averting human 
suffering be the primary purpose of the intervention.153  Given the highly 
limited and precise nature of the strikes—attacking an airbase from 
which the chemical attack originated in 2017 and attacking Assad’s 
chemical weapons infrastructure in 2018—it is plausible that the strikes 
were primarily about halting or averting human suffering. 154  Launching 
cruise missiles and conducting airstrikes against a couple targets in Syria 
certainly does not indicate a strategy of regime change. 
Fourth, the U.S. had already attempted to end the crisis 
diplomatically, therefore, the strikes were done as a last resort.155  As 
previously mentioned, the United States has tried multiple times to pass 
a UNSCR concerning the Syrian civil war and the Syrian government’s 
use of chemical weapons, but was prevented by Russia and China.156  
More importantly, the United States did persuade Syria to give up its 
chemical weapons through diplomacy in 2013.157  Although the naiveté 
of such an action is debatable, the United States’ creation of a diplomatic 
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agreement to solve the issue, and Syria’s subsequent violation of that 
agreement, shows that military intervention was a last resort. 
Fifth, the strikes were also proportional because they were limited 
to airbases and Assad’s chemical weapons infrastructure.158  R2P 
requires that the military action taken must be the minimum necessary 
to achieve the desired result.159  In the realm of kinetic military action, it 
is almost impossible to envision an intervention more limited than those 
conducted by the Trump administration in 2017 and 2018. 
Sixth, the strikes had a reasonable prospect of success because they 
stood a reasonable chance of halting the chemical weapon attacks and 
because the strikes did not worsen the situation.  In terms of the former, 
the strikes destroyed, or at least attempted to destroy, Bashar al-Assad’s 
means of using chemical weapons and attempted to deter their further 
use.160  The 2017 strike targeted Shayrat airbase because it was used to 
store chemical weapons and housed the aircraft used to deploy them.161  
The 2018 strike targeted a research center for developing, producing, and 
testing chemical weapons technology and chemical weapons storage 
sites.162  The U.S. military believed that the strike had at least done some 
damage to Assad’s ability to use chemical weapons.163  Indeed, after the 
attack, U.S. Lieutenant General Kenneth McKenzie asserted that the 
strikes had “set the Syrian chemical weapons program back for years.”164   
Moreover, when writing R2P, the ICISS was responding to 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s millennium challenge and was 
concerned with the humanitarian crises of the 1990s: Rwanda and 
various crises emanating from the breakup of Yugoslavia.165  As a result, 
this factor stipulates that a country’s humanitarian intervention must not 
make a situation worse than if no action were taken.166  President 
Trump’s strikes are consistent with this factor because the strikes did not 
exacerbate Syrian civilian’s suffering by directly harming or killing 
them, or by prolonging the civil war. 
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2. Russia’s Annexation of Crimea 
Conversely, Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea would not comply 
with R2P’s factors and would, therefore, be illegal.  President Putin 
argued that, among other reasons, Russia’s actions were a legal 
humanitarian intervention because of the threat that the new nationalist 
Ukrainian government posed to ethnic Russians in Crimea.167  The 
annexation, however, does not comply with any of R2P’s factors. 
First, the annexation of Crimea was not done with right authority.  
Russia never sought Security Council authorization to launch a 
humanitarian intervention in Crimea; Russia never submitted the matter 
for consideration under a “Uniting for Peace” procedure; and Russia did 
not act through a regional organization.168 
Second, there was no “large scale loss of life” or “large scale ethnic 
cleansing” being perpetrated against ethnic Russians that would rise to 
the level of just cause envisioned by the ICISS.169  One might counter 
that there existed a significant enough threat to ethnic Russians living in 
Crimea to warrant Russia’s intervention.  Vladimir Putin accused the 
pre-2014 revolution Ukrainian government of discriminating against 
ethnic Russians by forcing them to assimilate and stated that the post-
revolution government would repress ethnic Russians.170  President 
Putin even suggested that ethnic Russians might be subject to harsher 
laws as the new Ukrainian government was the ideological heir of 
“[Stepan] Bandera, Hitler’s [Ukrainian] accomplice during World War 
II.”171  Yet, the ICISS specifically stated that it had “resisted any 
temptation to identify as a ground for military intervention human rights 
violations falling short of outright killing or ethnic cleansing,” such as 
discrimination based on ethnicity.172 
Third, Russia’s actions were not taken with the right intentions 
because the primary purpose for the annexation was something other 
than halting human suffering, such as recapturing former Soviet 
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territories,173 securing a port for the Black Sea Fleet,174 or ensuring 
domestic regime security.175 
Fourth, even if the annexation of Crimea was taken with the right 
intention for a just cause, it was not a last resort.  To the extent that the 
operation was a humanitarian one—Vladimir Putin’s humanitarian 
justification is suspect at best—Russia never tried to resolve whatever 
grievance it had with the Ukrainian government concerning ethnic 
Russians in Crimea diplomatically. 
Fifth, Russia’s annexation was also not proportional because it was, 
by no stretch of the imagination, the minimum necessary to achieve the 
desired result.   
The final factor, reasonable prospects for success, is somewhat 
difficult to analyze because it raises the question of whether Russia’s 
annexation made the humanitarian situation better rather than worse.  
This means that there must have been a humanitarian crisis that 
necessitated the intervention.  As mentioned previously, there was no 
large-scale crisis, and Russia annexed Crimea for motives other than a 
humanitarian one.  It is, therefore, impossible to answer whether a non-
existent and non-imminent humanitarian crisis was made better by 
annexation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The United States’ use of military force against the Assad regime 
is legal under international law because there is a customary 
international law exception to the U.N. Charter’s prohibition on the use 
of force—humanitarian intervention.  Furthermore, the customary 
international law exception should exist because its advantages outweigh 
its disadvantages and would lead to a more just world.   
The discussion and analysis of humanitarian intervention raises 
several additional thoughts that must be addressed before ending.  First, 
if humanitarian intervention is an illegal violation of the prohibition on 
the use of force then perhaps there is something wrong with the current 
international legal system.  The United Nations was “built upon the idea 
of sovereignty for all its members,” and it is the organization’s main 
concern.176  Yet does that mean that fundamental human rights must be 
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forever subordinate to a state’s inviolable sovereignty?  Must states be 
forced do nothing and watch a genocide unfold for fear of infringing on 
another state’s sovereignty?  After Operation Allied Force, former 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright stated that, “[t]he crisis in Kosovo 
should cause a re-examination of the paradigms of the past.  As the world 
has changed, so have the roles of key institutions such as the EU, NATO 
and the United Nations.”177  Indeed, those paradigms—primarily 
absolute state sovereignty—are increasingly incongruent with the 
morality and nature of the modern world. 
Second, to what extent does conducting humanitarian interventions, 
to the extent they are illegal, erode the rule of law and risk the destruction 
of the current international system based on the United Nations?  Some 
scholars of international law share a similar opinion with Vladimir Putin, 
that humanitarian intervention outside the U.N. framework could result 
in the end of the United Nations system.178  Other scholars question the 
role the United Nations has played in preserving international peace and 
argue that the current system might not be worth keeping.179  Michael 
Glennon, for example, claimed that “[d]iplomatic historians have yet to 
identify a single instance of interstate violence that was actually stopped 
by the United Nations.”180  This raises the question: would violating the 
current international order by conducting a humanitarian intervention 
really be a net negative occurrence? 
Third, does international law matter?  History has shown that if 
states, especially powerful ones, determine that a certain course of action 
is in their interests, then they will take such action despite its illegality.  
Similarly, if a state determines that conducting a humanitarian military 
operation is morally just and not too costly, then it will conduct the 
operation even if it is illegal.  There have certainly been no serious 
reprisals levied against states for conducting legitimate humanitarian 
interventions.  All this lends credence to the idea that it really does not 
matter what international law is.  What matters is power, and a state’s 
will to use it.  Perhaps the fundamental nature of international relations 
has not changed too much over time and can still be accurately described 
by the statement the Athenians made to the Melians in Thucydides’ 
Peloponnesian War: “since you know as well as we do that right, as the 
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world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong 
do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”181 
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